



The exemption provided in § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,1
has attracted the attention of an ever growing number of commenta-
tors of federal securities law.2 A significant milestone in its exegesis
was the adoption of rule 146 (the rule).3 The rule is entitled, "Trans-
actions by an Issuer Deemed not to Involve any Public Offering."
The title tracks the language of § 4(2), which provides an exemption
from the registration provisions of § 5 of the Act for "transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering." 4 The release accom-
panying the rule notes that
the Rule is designed to provide more objective standards for
determining when offers or sales of securities by an issuer would be
deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within
the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Act.'
The adoption of amendments to the rule in May, 1975,6 the
issuance of numerous no-action letters and interpretive releases by
the SEC, several judicial decisions,7 and the continued study of the
subject by Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association make the time propitious for a review of the
present status of the private offering exemption.
* Member of the Ohio Bar; the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Edwin M.
Walker, an associate in the firm of which the author is a member.
£ 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2 Coles, Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a Deter-
rent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395 (1975); Kinderman, Private
Offering Exemption: An Examination of its Availability Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus.
LAW. 921 (1975); McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IA. L. REv. 525 (1974);
Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption-Historical Perspective and Analysis. 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Schwartz); Weinberg & McManus, Private
Placement Exemption Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 Revisited, 27 BAYLOR
L. REV. 201 (1975).
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 39 FED. REG. 15261 (June 10, 1974).
Securites Act Release No. 33-5585, 40 FED. REG. 21709 (May 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Amendment Release].
I Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d
367 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp., C.C.H. FED, SEc. L. REP.
95,229 at 98, 119 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1975); Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
1104 (D. Mass. 1974).
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I. AMENDMENTS TO THE RULE
A. Communications not Deemed To Be Solicitations
The concept of a private offering exemption by its nature ex-
cludes the possibility of general advertising or solicitation. Thus para-
graph (c) of the rule as originally adopted prohibited
any form of general solicitation or general advertising, including but
not limited to the following:
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication,
except that if subparagraph (d)(1) is satisfied as to each person to
whom the communication is directed and the communication con-
tains an undertaking to provide the information specified by subpar-
agraph (e)(1) on request, such communication shall be deemed not
to be a form of general solicitation or advertising.
This requirement to provide extensive information relating to the
issuer was applicable to each offeree whether or not such person
eventually became a buyer of the securities offered,8 and placed a
heavy burden on an offeror. The Commission's purpose in including
this requirement was to discourage general solicitation. However, in
the Amendment Release, the Commission recognizes that
[t]his provision created an unnecessary burden, e.g., even if an of-
feree decides not to purchase, the issuer would still be required to
send information to him. Moreover, the Rule provides protections
against general solicitation in that it requires the issuer and any
persons acting on its behalf to have reasonable grounds to believe
prior to making an offer that the offeree has a requisite knowledge
and experience or can bear the economic risk of investment?
It therefore amended subparagraph (c)(3) of the rule to delete
the words "and the communication contains an undertaking to pro-
vide the information specified by subparagraph (e)(1) on request."
Thus without decreasing protection for investors (since the informa-
tion must be supplied whether or not the legend is set forth), the
Commission has relieved the issuer of a small part of its burden.
B. Information Requirements
In order to meet the "furnishing of information" test, an issuer
8 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975). See, Schwartz, supra, note 2, at 759.
1 Amendment Release, supra note 6, at 21709.
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that is not a reporting company under the Securities Exchange Act
of 193410 is required by subparagraph (e)(1)(ii)(b) to supply
the information that would be required to be included in a registra-
tion statement filed under the Act on the form which the issuer
would be entitled to use provided that if the issuer does not have
the audited financial statements required by such form and cannot
obtain them without unreasonable effort or expense, such financial
statements may be provided on an unaudited basis; ...
The application of these provisions raised certain questions; e.g., (1)
must an offeror furnish the financial schedules called for by Part II
of Form S-1 and (2) how complete must the unaudited financial
statements be? In order to provide some flexibility, the Commission
amended subsection (b) to allow the issuer to omit details and employ
condensations, if under the circumstances, the omitted materials are
not material and their omission is not misleading. In addition, regula-
tion A financial statements may be furnished, 12 and the financial
schedules required in Part II of Form S-1 need not be provided if they
have not been prepared.
C. Business Combinations
Paragraph (f) of the rule relating to business combinations has
been among the more criticized sections. One of the problems with
paragraph (f) is that it used the definition of "business combinations"
found in rule 14511 under the Act. This definition includes reclassifi-
cations, mergers, consolidations and acquisitions of assets through a
shareholder vote. Rule 145 and its definition were developed as a
result of the Wheat Report,14 which led to the repeal of rule 1331S and
the substitution of rule 145. In the original comments to rule 146, it
was noted that: "[i]n an exchange offer [B reorganization] the issuer
has a choice of offerees and, therefore, does not need the special
provisions of paragraph (0."16 The Commission modified its position
in the Amendment Release, noting:
[h]owever, the Commission has reconsidered this position and now
' 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act].
"17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1975).
12 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (1975).
t 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1975).
" F. WHEAT, DisCLOSURE TO INVESTORS (1968).
, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1975).
' Release No. 33-5487, supra note 5, at 15,261.
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believes that it is preferable not to distinguish among different types
of business combinations when the result is the same, as long as
there is adequate protection for investors. Therefore, the Commis-
sion is amending subparagraph (f)(1) to expand the definition of
"business combination" for the purposes of the Rule to include, in
addition to the transactions of the types specified in paragraph (a)
of Rule 145, exchanges of stock including the type described in
Section 368(a)(l)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, commonly
known as "B Reorganizations."' 7
D. Number of Purchasers: Good Faith Test
Subparagraph (g)(1) of the rule provided that, "[t]here shall be
no more than thirty-five purchasers in any offering pursuant to the
Rule." The amendment to subparagraph (g)(1) provides that "[t]he
issuer shall have reasonable grounds to believe, and after making
reasonable inquiry, shall believe, that there are no more than thirty-
five purchasers. . . ." Thus the question now is one of the issuer's
good faith rather than a strict numerical test. This may be the first
step on the part of the Commission toward the adoption of the con-
cept of the "I and I Defense" proposed by Carl W. Schneider and
Charles C. Zall.18
It is to be hoped that the Commission will relax other aspects
of the rule to permit the substitution of substantial compliance for
absolute compliance. By way of illustration, consider situations
where there has been omission of the legend on the certificate re-
quired by subparagraph (h)(2), or a failure to obtain a signed, written
agreement from a purchaser as required by subparagraph (h)(4) of
the rule, where in fact these failures did not contribute to an improper
distribution. In this type of situation, the issuer's attempted good
faith compliance should override any technical noncompliance with
the provisions of the rule.
' Amendment Release, supra note 6, at 21,710.
's Schneider & Zall, Sec. 12 and the Imperfect Exempt Transaction: The Proposed I and
I Defense, 28 Bus. LAW. 1011 (1973). These authors make the eminently reasonable suggestion
that a plaintiff should not be able to obtain recission based solely upon a defendant's failure to
meet the requirements of a claimed exemption in its offering to another person if defendant
can show that as to such other person the failure is both innocent and immateral. However,
the defense would not bar recovery by a plaintiff who could show a substantial defect in
defendant's sale to him. An innocent act is the result of simple negligence as opposed to gross
negligence or intentional act or omission. Immateriality is to be judged in the economic context
of the transaction, in a manner to prevent a plaintiff barred from rescission by the defense from
having the issuer injured by the recovery of others not barred. As to this latter point, the authors
suggest, "if no more than 5% of the securities sold were done so in a defective manner, the
defect should be deemed to have been immaterial." 28 Bus. LAW. at 1015.
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II. INTERPRETIVE RELEASES AND No-ACTION LETTERS
A. Advertising
Two interpretive releases deal with the question of advertising
and its relation to the rule. In a very early release, 9 a program where
an oil company proposed a "blind advertisement" to appear in publi-
cations handed out on airlines and designed to identify individuals
who would be potential participants in placements under rule 146,
was considered to be inappropriate. It was noted that
in view of the proposed reliance of the company upon the provisions
of Rule 146, there appears to be a serious question raised as to the
availability of an exemption under Section 4(2) of the Act, should
the proposed advertisement contribute to an effort to find proposed
offerees of future privately sponsored programs.
By way of contrast, a subsequent release 2 advised that paragraph (c)
of the rule was not intended to "preclude broker-dealers from using
the media to attract issuers as customers." The release warns, how-
ever, that if individual private investors were attracted by the adver-
tisement, the existence of a violation of rule 146(c) would be based
on the special facts and circumstances of each situation. These posi-
tions are consistent with the spirit of the rule's prohibition on adver-
tising restricting the scope of activities of issuers and broker-dealers
in locating potential buyers.
B. Condominium Sales
Confirming the somewhat subjective impression that the rule
finds more application for noncorporate issuers than for corporate
issuers, a 1974 release2' approved without difficulty the availability
of the rule to the offer and sale of condominium units that were by
definition a security.
C. Offeree Representatives as Investment Advisers
Three recent letters dealt with the interface of the concept of
offeree representative under the rule and the Investment Advisers Act
" Damson Oil Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. If 79,916 [1974-75 Transfer Binder] (July
5, 1974).
Borden & Ball, (October 23, 1974).
21 Russell T. Gorgone, (September 23, 1974).
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of 1940.22 In one,23 the Division of Investment Management Regula-
tion advised that a law firm that proposed to be listed on a list of
offeree representatives would be engaged in the business of rendering
investment advice. Furthermore, if it received compensation for serv-
ices as an offeree representative, it would fall within the definition of
an investment adviser under the 1940 Act. The Division further noted
that it did not appear that the exception in the 1940 Act for a lawyer
whose performance of investment advisory services is solely limited
to the practice of his profession 4 would be available to the law firm
in this situation, since
performing the duties of an offeree representative would necessarily
involve advising others as to the advisability of investing in or pur-
chasing securities. At the very least, an offeree representative would
be involved in the issuance of an analysis or report concerning the
securities.
In this context, it might be noted that at the annual SEC Speaks,
Alan B. Levenson, Director of the Division of Corporate Finance,
stated that there is "an implied condition that when an offeree repre-
sentative is used, he evaluates and makes the recommendation." ' 5
The facts in the Epsilon Lambda Electronics Corporation no-
action letter26 may be somewhat typical of what we would expect to
encounter in the future. Epsilon Lambda proposed to issue shares of
unregistered common stock to more than fifteen private individuals
in several states. In reliance upon the rule, it engaged the Clermont
Company, a registered broker-dealer to serve as offeree representa-
tive for all prospective purchasers under the proposed offer, its fee
to be paid by Epsilon Lambda. The Clermont Company would not
be active in soliciting purchasers and had no present intention of
- 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1970); [hereinafter cited as the 1940 Act]. The 1940 Act provides
comprehensive regulation of investment advisers, defined as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities, or as to
the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities, or who, for compen-
sation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities; . ...
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ii) (1970). The 1940 Act also requires registration with the Commission,
establishes record-keeping standards, provides minimum standards for advisory contracts, pro-
hibits fraudulent transactions, and sets penalties for its violation.
2 Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Trimble, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,131 [1974-75
Transfer Binder]. (February 21, 1975).
' 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1970).
292 BNA SEC. REG. & L. RP. at A-8 (March 5, 1975).
" Epsilon Lambda Electronics Corporation, (October 11, 1974).
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acting as an offeree representative under rule 146 with respect to any
other transaction or as holding itself out as being interested in doing
so. Under these circumstances, the Division advised that it would not
recommend the Commission take any action if the Clermont Com-
pany proceeded without registration under the 1940 Act. This re-
sponse makes it clear that in the case of broker-dealers, a key ques-
tion under the 1940 Act appears to be the number of times one firm
acts as an offeree representative.
The staff of the Commission does not appear to be fully satisfied
with the various conflicts that exist between the rule and the 1940
Act. Alan S. Mostoff, Director of the Division of Investment Man-
agement Regulations, noted that, "[i]f the compensation of the of-
feree representative is contingent upon finding buyers, then there
could be definitely a breach of the Act." 7 Alan B. Levenson, com-
menting on the same subject, said that the Commission, in deciding
that the issuer could pay the offeree representative, was seeking to
avoid creating a situation where another person would be involved as
an intermediary and costs would be elevated. "The Advisers Act
problems will have to be clarified in amendments,""8 he said. Unfor-
tunately, these amendments have not been forthcoming.
D. Offeree Representatives in Business Combinations
Another letter on offeree representatives clarified a potentially
troublesome area of business combinations. 9 This problem involved
a proposal that the chief executive officers of the acquired company
serve as the offeree representatives to represent the interests of some
or all of the shareholders of the acquired company. It was further
noted that the officers would enter into new employment agreements,
which would be guaranteed by the acquiring company. The general
terms and arrangements of the employment agreements, of course,
would be disclosed to the acquired company's shareholders. None of
the proposed offeree representatives were affiliates of the acquiring
company. In response, the Division wrote that
the chief executive officers of an acquired company are not excluded
from the definition of "offeree representative" as set forth in para-
graph (a)(1) of Rule 146 . . . where such persons are not officers
" 292 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. at A-8 (March 5, 1975).
29 Id.
21 Lancaster Colony Corp., (February 7, 1975).
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of the issuer/acquiring company, notwithstanding any employment
relationships between such persons and the issuer effective subse-
quent to a business combination."
E. Integration of Offerings
It is in the area of integration that the Commission has provided
us with the most interesting series of no-action letters providing liber-
alization for the issuer and certainty for the practitioner. It will be
recalled that the operative term in paragraph (b) of the rule, "Condi-
tions To Be Met," is "offering." A determination must be made as
to whether the offering in question stands by itself or whether it
should be regarded as part of a "larger offering made or to be
made."'31 In securities jargon, this problem is referred to as a ques-
tion of integration.
(1) Noncorporate Offerings
A problem often arises as to whether the offerings of two limited
partnerships with the same corporate general partner should be con-
sidered as one offering .3  A recent no-action letter involved a
Georgia corporation engaged in the breeding, training and racing of
thoroughbred horses. Its principal business facility is an 1100-acre
farm. From time to time the corporation purchases horses that it
resells to limited partnerships. The partnerships are organized by the
corporation for the purpose of raising and/or breeding the horses.
Each partnership owns only one horse. Separate books and records
are kept for each partnership and a separate bank account main-
tained for funds of each partnership. There is no interdependence
among the purchasers for purposes otherwise. The corporation's
president serves as the general partner of each limited partnership.
The corporation sought to offer these partnerships in reliance
3 Id.
31 Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 FED. REG. 11316, 11317 (November 6, 1967).
A determination whether an offering is public or private would also include a consid-
eration of the question whether it should be regarded as a part of a larger offering
made or to be made. The following factors are relevant to such question of integra-
tion: whether (I) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing, (2)
the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security, (3) the offerings are made
at or about the same time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received, (5)
the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
12 See Schwartz supra note 2, at 757 n.79
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upon the registration exemption provided by §§ 4(2) and 3(a)( 11)33
under the Act and rules 146 and 147.11 Based on the foregoing, the
staff expressed the view that the offer of interests in separate limited
partnerships as proposed would not be deemed to be part of the same
larger offering solely because there is a common general partner in
each of the partnerships.3 1 It is apparent from the statement of facts
that there is more in common among the partnerships than the gen-
eral partner.
In the same vein, separate offerings of limited partnerships sold
by the same registered broker-dealer for the same real estate
developer, involving a "1975 program" of three separate apartment
complexes and three shopping centers (two of which were in the same
city); and a "1974 program," consisting of the first phase of an
apartment complex in Tulsa, Oklahoma financed in early 1974; and
a subsequent phase of the same apartment complex and a shopping
center in Nebraska, were, in view of the staff "not to be integrated
for the purpose of § 4(2) of the Act as parts of one or more or larger
offerings of securities" even though similar projects were contem-
plated for 1976.36
The staff responded similarly to an inquiry relating to the forma-
tion of successive limited partnerships for oil exploration and devel-
opment. The request for a ruling noted that the two partnerships
would not invest in any of the same or related prospects, that the
profit-sharing arrangements would be different in each partnership
and that the profits or losses of one partnership would in no way
affect the profitability of the other partnerships. The staff's reply was,
"[g]enerally speaking, it is this Division's position that each limited
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1971) provides in pertinent part:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subparagraph shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(I1) Any security which is part ofan issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single state or territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident
in and doing business within, or ifa corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such state or territory.
31 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975).
Dogwood Farm, Inc., (September 1, 1975).
11 Dasere & Company, Inc., (June 16, 1975). This letter, together with Dogwood Farm,
Inc. (September 1, 1975) may indicate a softening of the staffs position on integration. For
example, one corporation was advised that twenty-six separate offerings over a period of ten
years might be subject to integration. The staff subsequently refused to issue a no-action letter
with respect to five proposed limited partnerships "in view of the fact that no offerings had yet
been made and consequently no facts are available for interpretation." Calprop Corp.
(September 28, 1971) cited in R. HAFT, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS § 2.0311] (2d ed. 1974).
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partnership would be considered to be a separate issuer of limited
partnership interests," and somewhat cryptically added, "[it would
appear a useful inquiry as well to assume that the same issuer was
involved and then consider whether that issuer was issuing the 'same
class of security."' Another interesting question contained in the
same request for the no-action letter concerned the possibility of two
partnerships together constituting one rule 146 offering if the aggre-
gate number of investors in two partnerships was not over thirty-five,
even though approximately half of the investors received information
on one partnership and the other half on another partnership. The
staff refused to rule on this question.37
An earlier request involved a registered public offering of inter-
ests in an oil program together with two proposed private limited
partnerships that would participate in the same oil and gas leases as
the public partnership. Here the staff concluded that the two offer-
ings, the public partnership and the private partnership, should be
integrated."
One problem of integration is whether the focus should be on the
independent project or on the business of the common general part-
ner. 3 These letters appear to settle the question in favor of the
former approach.
(2) Corporate Offerings
The concept of integration cuts across all phases of securities
law. Thus an inquiry in early 1975 involved possible integration under
§§ 3(a)(3) 0 and 4(2) of the Act. The § 3(a)(3) transactions involved
commercial paper issued by a registered bank holding company and
the § 4(2) transaction involved short-term promisssory notes that did
not qualify for § 3(a)(3) exemption. The short-term promissory notes
would be issued by a subsidiary of the bank holding company and
guaranteed by it. The staff advised that the doctrine of integration
1 Guardian Oil Company, (June 19, 1975).
May Petroleum, Inc., (August 28, 1974).
11 Schwartz, supra note 2, at n.79; Note, Application of the Securities Doctrine of In-
tegration to Real Estate Syndications, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 428, 454 (1973).
40 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1971). This section exempts
(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current
transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited; . . ..
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would not be applied to the two transactions.41
The staff came out on two different sides of somewhat similar
inquiries relating to stock option plans. One involved the possibility
of integration between an offering of shares under an unregistered
restricted stock option plan and an offering under several registered
stock option plans. The staff concluded that the shares were part of
the same class of securities, despite varying Federal income tax treat-
ment restrictions on transfer or pledge and resale requirements ap-
plicable to shares issued under the restricted stock option plan.12 The
other inquiry involved a small company with a large number of stock
options outstanding. The company proposed to rely on rule 146 for
sales of stock under the plan to up to thirty-five participants. There-
after, sales under the plan would be made pursuant to the registration
requirements of the Act. The staff found no fault with this proposal
provided six months intervened between the sales to the last of the
thirty-five persons and the subsequent registered offering; under such
circumstances the two groups of sales "would not be deemed to be
parts of the same larger offering."43
(3) Foreign Offerings
The staff has been liberal in the area of integrating foreign
offerings with United States offerings. In a recent interpretation of
the rule, the staff dealt with a situation in which a private offering to
domestic and foreign purchasers exceeded thirty-five, although there
were less than thirty-five domestic purchasers. The question was,
whether for the purposes of the rule, nonresident alien purchasers of
the company's common stock should be excluded in determining
whether the thirty-five purchaser requirement of subparagraph (g)(1)
of the rule had been complied with. The Division of Corporate Fi-
nance had no difficulty in expressing the view that nonresident aliens
need not be included in the computation used to determine compli-
ance with the thirty-five purchaser requirement of subparagraph
(g)(1)." Several other recent letters reached similar conclusions." All
*' A. S. Becker & Co., Inc., (February 18, 1975).
42 Rohr Industries, Inc., (February 2, 1975).
4 Geosource, Inc., (June 30, 1975).
" Salt Cay Beaches Limited, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 79,985 [1974-75 Transfer Binder]
(October 14, 1974).
11 Great Southwest Corporation, (January 22, 1975). Dentsply International Inc.,
(October 24, 1974); Griffith Laboratories, Inc., (July 17, 1974). These letters contradict So-
ward's view expressed in SOWARD, II BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONAL FEDERAl. SECURITIIUs ACT
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these apparently implement the long standing view of the Commis-
sion that "the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Act are
primarily intended to protect the American investor ... .
F. Number of Purchasers-Bank Commingled Fund
Note 5 to the rule states
[cilients of an investment adviser, customers of a broker or dealer,
trusts administered by a bank trust department or persons with
similar relationships shall be considered to be the offerees or pur-
chasers for purposes of the Rule regardless of the amount of dis-
cretion given to the investment adviser, broker or dealer, bank trust
department or other person to act on behalf of the client, customer
or trust.
This note reversed an old SEC position on discretionary accounts
exemplified by a no-action letter stating that a trustee with forty-four
discretionary accounts would be considered one person in counting
investors under the private placement exemptions.47
A recent interpretive release indicates a softening of the position
taken in note 5. The inquiry related to a bank that established a
commingled fund for the purchase of privately placed securities. Par-
ticipation in the fund is limited to pension and profit sharing trusts
that are exempt from federal taxation. Trusts participating in the
fund will have a proportionate interest in its assets, but will not be
issued any certificate or document evidencing a direct or indirect
interest in the fund. Based on these facts, the staff concluded that for
rule 146 purposes, purchases of the private placements would be
deemed purchases by a single purchaser, namely the fund, rather than
by the separate participating trusts. In reaching its conclusion, the
staff noted the control that the bank would exercise over the manage-
ment of the fund.4" In view of the lack of input of the participants in
§ 4.02111 (1973). He feels that if the
offering is made partly to persons in the United States and partly to persons in
foreign countries, [then] the total number of offerees must be considered in determin-
ing the availability of the exemption whether the offering originates in this country
or in the foreign country. For example, if ABC, Inc., a Delaware corporation, makes
a million dollar stock offering, part of which is purchased for investment by a
selected group of 25 or less investment purchasers in this country and the remainder
to 200 in Canada, ABC, Inc. has made a public offering. [emphasis supplied].
11 Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, 29 FED. REG. 9828 (July 9, 1964).
V See C. WHITMAN, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS IN RULE 146, SEC SPEAKS AGAIN (1973).
11 First National City Bank, (October 9, 1975).
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investment decisions, there does not seem to be any compelling rea-
son to extend the protection of the rule to them; so the staff's position
does not seem to violate the spirit of the rule.
III. RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Woolf Case: Rule 10b-5 In Private Offerings
The most interesting recent judicial development is the Fifth
Circuit case of Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co.49 The Woolf case follows
the line of that circuit's decisions on securities law issues that have
provided exercise material for legal scholars to sharpen their critical
faculties. After SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina,
Inc. ,1 many practitioners felt that a private placement could only be
done with corporate insiders. The court in Woolf retreats from this
extreme interpretation of Continental, but introduces a new note in
providing a double penalty for a failure to meet the terms of the
§ 4(2) exemption; the court allows not only the penalties of § 12, with
its short statute of limitations 5 but also an almost per se violation
of § 10 of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5 with its vague and various
statutes of limitations.52
Woolf involved an action under § 10(b) and rule IOb-5 for money
11 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975).
5 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
1 15 U.S.C. § 77M (1973), which essentially provides a one year period.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
of instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1974):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Neither § 10 nor rule lob-5 provide a statute of limitations, and the periods are therefore
governed by state statutes. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.5(1) (1974).
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damages by purchasers in a private placement. It would appear that
the statute of limitations had foreclosed any action under § 12 of the
Act. The trial court, sitting without a jury, characterized the plaintiffs
as "sophisticated investors" and found that the defendant had not
violated rule 1Ob-5. Plaintiffs were apparently sophisticated investors;
one had actually been employed as the manager of the Miami office
of the defendant's brokerage firm and had been in the brokerage
business for many years. The other was an attorney of extensive
experience who had made substantial investments in the stock market
through the defendants. No formal offering circular was prepared or
delivered to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did obtain written information,
but it is not clear as to whether it was intended for their use.
The court characterized the question before it as
the extent to which Rule lOb-5 provides a remedy to a purchaser of
securities against the issuer or others involved in the distribution
when the issuer and its agents fail to conduct the distribution in such
a manner that qualifies for the exemption from registration pro-
vided by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.11
It answered its question by stating, "[w]e think, however, that Rule
lOb-5 is broad enough to afford a remedy for the wrongdoing that's
alleged here."54 The court concluded that
there comes a point where failure to disclose can be characterized
as an "act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit" upon the offerees in yiolation of the
third clause of the rule [10b-5115
This point is reached when
the omissions or misrepresentations of information that make the
§ 4(2) exemption unavailable to the defendants, in their cumulative
effect, were such that a reasonable investor, had the information
registration would have afforded been available, might have consid-
ered them important in the making of his investment decision. 8
One wonders why, if there are such omissions or misrepresentations
of information, there is not a simple violation of clause two of rule
lOb-5, without going into a deep analysis of the requirements of
§ 4(2).
0 515 F.2d at 605.
54 Id.
Id. at 608.
'6 Id. at 614.
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B. The Woolf Case: The Fifth Circuit on Private Offerings
In the course of the opinion, the court makes some interesting
observations about the § 4(2) exemption and its own decisions in Hill
York Corporation v. American International Franchises, Inc.17 and
Continental. Reacting to its many critics, "8 the court said
The gist of the criticism has been that Continental virtually requires
that all offerees have "insider" status, if a transaction is to qualify
as exempt under Section 4(2). We think these fears are unfounded.
The quoted language must be read in conjunction with the balance
of the opinion, in which we noted that, although the record reflected
that there were at least 38 offerees, 35 of whom bought stock,
Continental failed to sustain its burden of proving that there were
not more than the 38 offerees revealed in the evidence adduced by
the S.E.C.59
In any event, we may be pleased there has been this explicit rejection
of the inferred requirement that all the offerees have "insider" status
with the issuer if registration is to be unnecessary.
Probably the part of the Woolf opinion that will provide the
greatest food for thought in the preparation of future private place-
ments is the emphasis on a disclosure document equal to a prospectus
contained in a registration statement. As the court noted in reviewing
Hill York, "[w]e approved the trial court's jury charge 'that every
offeree had to have information equivalent to that which a registra-
tion statement would disclose,' "" and then again flatly "the issuer
and its agents in a private placement must afford each offeree with
the information registration would have afforded a prospective inves-
tor in a public offering.""1 The court in applying these tests notes that
the plaintiffs did not receive financial statements or other information
bearing on prior performance of the predecessor corporation to the
issuer, and that there was no disclosure of physical facilities and their
suitability for the proposed enterprise or disclosure of capital struc-
ture, dividend rights, preemptive rights, and the like. The court added
"T 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
" See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 2 at 746 et seq. The court cites S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS & RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 2.16[a] (1971); and KRIPKE, "'Wrap-Up" Revolution
in Securities Regulation 29 Bus. LAW. (Special Issue) 185, 187 (1973).
' 515 F.2d at 610.
I d. at 610. Cf. the decision in Livens v. William D. Witter Co., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D.
Mass. 1974); text accompanying notes 82-88, infra, and the Position Paper, text accompanying
notes 99-100, infra.
11 515 F.2d at 613.
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that the record did not show where the issuer had revealed the names
and backgrounds of the directors and officers, their compensation or
their options to purchase securities or any of the other requirements
of Schedule A."2
Two other tangential references to § 4(2) are intriguing. The first
of these is the statement that "[t]he absence of any personal contact
with the issuer or its agents here would tend to indicate a manner of
offering more public than private, using the Hill York formula-
tion."63 This is somewhat reminiscent of the first draft of rule 146,64
which required face-to-face negotiations, a proposal that was aban-
doned because of the many comments received noting that it was not
in accord with actual securities business practice.6
C. The Woolf Case: Rule 146
The Woolf court's comment that rule 146, although not purport-
ing to be an exclusive definition of the circumstances under which the
exemption is available, does "provide a useful frame of reference to
an appellate court in assessing the validity of Section 4(2) exemptions
claimed . ... 66 marks the beginning of a process that practitioners
have long feared.67 It should be noted that the first preliminary note
to the rule includes this statement:
[t]ransactions by an issuer which do not satisfy all the conditions
of this Rule shall not raise any presumption that the exemption
provided by Section 4(2) of the Act is not available for such transac-
tions. Issuers wanting to rely on that exemption may do so by
complying with administrative and judicial interpretations in effect
at the time of the transactions. Attempted compliance with this rule
does not act as an election; the issuer can also claim the availability
of Section 4(2) outside the rule.
62 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970).
515 F.2d at 614.
*' Securities Act Release No. 33-5336, 37 FED. REG. 26137 (November 28, 1972).
Securities Act Release No. 33-5430, 38 FED. REG. 28951 (October 10, 1973).
515 F.2d at 612.
See Letter from the Committee on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York to the Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission, January 25, 1973: "noting the substantial conditions to the availability
of the exemption set forth in the proposed Rule, the Committee believes that unless there is




However, if an appellate court, in assessing the availability of § 4(2)
exemptions refers to the rule as a "useful frame of reference," discus-
sion becomes circular and there will be little left of the exemption
outside of the rule.
Finally, concerning Woolf, it should be noted that a new viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 has been created-an omission of material informa-
tion, although not sufficient to be actionable under clause two, may
nevertheless be actionable under clause three because of the court's
requirement that each offeree be provided the information that regis-
tration would have afforded a prospective investor in a public offer-
ing.
D. The Woolf Case: Private Offerings Outside Rule 146
What is the present status of the § 4(2) exemption outside of the
rule in the Fifth Circuit after Woolf. The following factors seem
essential to establish such a § 4(2) exemption:
(1) the issuer must be prepared to prove that there was a lim-
ited number of offerees;
(2) there probably has to be personal contact between the offer-
ees and the issuer or its agent;
(3) the offerees probably have to be sophisticated;
(4) the offerees must be provided with the information registra-
tion would have afforded a prospective investor in a public offering;
(5) the private placement should stay fairly close to the guide-
lines provided by rule 146, except possibly, the requirement that the
offeree be able to bear the economic risk of investment."
E. The Universal Major Industries Case: The Second Circuit on
Private Offerings
Twenty days after Woolf, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York handed down its opinion in SEC
v. Universal Major Industries Corporation." Universal Major
Industries involved an enforcement action against an attorney ac-
cused of aiding and abetting the distribution of securities without
registration. The principal issue in the case became the availability
of the § 4(2) exemption. The claimed exemption involved the issuance
" In a footnote, the court denigrates this criteria, noting that it has not been dealt with
by any of its cases, and that "[ilt is remarkable that no consideration is given to the actual
risk of the investment opportunity." 515 F.2d 612, n.14.
1, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,229 at 98,199 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1975).
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of common stock upon conversion of outstanding debentures that
were admittedly sold in violation of the Act, due to the issuance of
common stock as interest upon the debentures, the issuance of com-
mon stock in exchange for fractional interests in oil wells where the
issuer or its controlling person also owned an interest in the same
wells, and the issuance of common stock for cash, services or prop-
erty supplied the issuer. An extract from a table contained in note 9
to the opinion 70 highlights the extent of the distribution:
Type of Transaction Dates No. of No. of
Shares Transferees
(I) Issuances upon conversion of
debentures 5/68-2/71 1,117,078 262
(2) Issuances for interest on
debentures in lieu of cash
payment 8/69-6/71 266,580 489
(3) Issuances for cash, property
or services 1/69-12/72 839,059 94
Universal Major Industries is somewhat reminiscent of SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.,71 when the large number of buyers in the alleged
"private placement" are considered. Referring to Ralston Purina, the
author has previously noted that:
[t]he Supreme Court was dealing with a situation in which there
were from 400 to 1,000 purchasers of stock in a space of three years
and offers to sell to 500 (sales were stopped by the litigation) in the
fourth year. Of course, these 1,000 employees are members of the
investing public and sales to them constitute a public offering. We
can easily sympathize with the Court's decision. The Court did not
have before it the question of whether sales to thirty-five artists,
bake shop foremen, chow loading foremen, clerical assitants, copy-
writers, electricians, stock clerks, mail office clerks, order credit
trainees, production trainees, stenographers and veterinarians over
a space of three years would have constituted a public offering.
Despite the Court's language that "an offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves in a transaction not involv-
ing any public offering" and "the focus of inquiry should be on the
need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration",
we suggest the Court would have reached the conclusion, under
those circumstances, that "the public benefits are too remote", and
10 Id. at 98,203 n.9.
It 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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that a sale by an issuer to thirty-five of its employees was a transac-
tion "by an issuer not involving any public offering." 2
The court in Universal continues the torturing of the decisional
law applicable to the § 4(2) exemption that was commenced with
Continental, stating
the mere disclosure of the same information as would be disclosed
in a registration statement to all persons offered unregistered stock
would not, in the absence of showing that the offerees had the
requisite relationship with the issuer and the ability to fend for
themselves, suffice to form the basis for an exemption under
[§ 4(2)]. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, Inc.,
supra, 463 F.2d at 160.11
As the court in Woolf stated, "The gist of the criticism has been that
Continental virtually requires that all offerees have 'insider' status,
if a transaction is to qualify as exempt under Section 4(2). We think
these fears are unfounded." Universal Major Industries indicates
that the fears were not unfounded.
The net message of the case seems to be the sophistication-access
test. Thus, "defendant failed to establish that all of those who pur-
chased UMI common stock or received stock for value belonged to
a class of persons who could 'fend' for themselves"7 5 and "defendant
failed to establish that those who received UMI common stock for
value either obtained automatically, or had access to, the sort of
information which UMI would have been compelled to disclose had
it filed a registration statement.""
The court finally comes to grips with the inquiry which might
have formed a rational basis for disposition of the entire case by
noting that,
it is conceivable that in certain circumstances, an offering to a small
number of people might provide some basis for invocation of the
Section 4(2) exemption. In a case such as this, however, where the
transferees numbered in the hundreds, the sheer size of the distribu-
tion tends to negate the assumption that no public offering was
involved. 77
72 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 776.
7 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. at 98,211.
74 515 F.2d at 610.
71 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 98,211.
76 Id.
" Id. at 98,212.
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We would suggest that this statement could have been the beginning
and the end of the court's inquiry.
F. Haber and Parvin: One-Purchaser Public Offerings
Haber v. Bordas,8 another recent opinion by the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, provides an interesting contrast with Universal
Major Industries in terms of the number of purchasers. There was
direct evidence of the offer of unregistered securities to two persons.
The court observes that there was evidence of offers to others, al-
though the extent of this evidence is obscure. No offering circular was
supplied and most of the information was oral. On this kind of re-
cord, the court found that the § 4(2) exemption was not available.
Relying heavily on the access formulation, the court said
the governing fact is whether persons to whom an offering was made
were in such a position with respect to the issuer that they either
actually had access to such information as a registration statement
would disclose or had the ability to gain such access."
In other words, the buyer must be an insider or an institutional
investor."0 Ominously the court noted that, "Congress had required
that at least 32 categories of information be included in a registration
statement." In other words, not just the key facts or material infor-
mation, but every single bit required by Schedule A is required under
Haber. Haber is just one more example of the difficulties the courts
have had in coming to grips with § 4(2). It is this sort of an opinion
that makes us ask whether the case by case judge-made law can ever
provide an appropriate basis for guidance of entrepreneurs in the
raising of venture capital.
Parvin v. Davis Oil Company"s involved the sale of fractional
interests in oil wells apparently only to plaintiff Parvin. The only
information Parvin received was either oral or contained in the par-
ticipation agreement. The court stated that while Parvin, because of
7s CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,330 at 98,656 (S.D.N.Y. October 16, 1975).
I' d. at 98,658.
'o It is interesting to note that the plaintiff, Warren Haber, regards himself as the founder
of two substantial public corporations, Campanelli Industries, Inc., formerly New America
Industries, Inc., a real estate development company, and Kenai Drilling Limited, a corporation
organized to own and operate oil well drilling equipment. Prospectus of Kenai Drilling Limited,
February 1, 1974.
11 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,345 at 98,711 (9th Cir. October 20, 1975).
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his previous experience in investing in oil properties, might be con-
sidered to be sophisticated, that alone was not sufficient without
access to the requisite information-"the sort of information that
would have appeared in the registration statement. ' 82
G. Livens: A Successful Defendant
A rare case won by the defendant is Livens v. William D. Witter,
Inc.13 The court disposed of the case easily on the basis of the one-
year statute of limitations provided by § 13 of the Act.84 But then,
apparently fascinated by the facts, the opinion continued to discuss
the § 4(2) issue. The placements themselves appeared to be models.
The first involved twenty-three offerees and twenty investors. The
second involved the same persons plus a twenty-first, and the same
for the third financing. The fourth financing involved thirty purchas-
ers including the original twenty. All of the investors were experi-
enced businessmen and investors. Plaintiff had been employed as an
investment analyst for State Street Research and Management Com-
pany, which served as investment adviser for three mutual funds with
assets totalling about one-half billion dollars and included private
accounts such as Harvard University Endowment Fund whose assets
were over a billion dollars. Plaintiff had graduated from Harvard
Business School and had an active personal portfolio. Plaintiff knew
that he was buying lettered securities and understood the significance
of restrictions on their transferability. Before making the first pur-
chase, plaintiff was informed specifically that (1) the securities were
highly speculative, (2) they were issued for investment by sophisti-
cated investors, (3) existing financial records of LPC (the issuer) were
incomplete and unreliable, and (4) additional financing might be re-
quired in the months ahead. Before deciding to make subsequent
purchases, plaintiff received several reports, discussed its problems
with individual defendants and officers of the company, visited the
company's offices and attended shareholders' meetings. Plaintiff was
kept well informed of operating and financial conditions. There was
never any advertisement of public solicitation.
Against this near-model background, plaintiff argued the
unavailability of the § 4(2) exemption for two reasons:
(1) plaintiff did not sign an investment letter, nor did the stock
82 Id. at 98,715.
374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
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certificates bear a legend to the effect that they were restricted; and
(2) neither plaintiff nor any of the other purchasers had access
to the type of information that would appear in a registration state-
ment because no such information was available. In particular, no
reliable financial statements existed for the three years prior to the
investment.
The court disposed of the plaintiff's first argument by noting that
the investment letter "is but one of several relevant factors, and at
the trial the investment intent of plaintiff and the other parties was
never seriously disputed.""
As to the second point, the court was troubled by the lack of
financial statements.
Financial information covering the three years preceding the issu-
ance of the securities, to be disclosed in items (25), (26) and (27) of
Schedule A, is extremely important, generally speaking. But again,
some items in the financial statements of an issuing corporation
have a much greater bearing on the investment merit of its securities
than others. In this case the missing information was basically the
extent of accounts payable. The fact that they were not accurately
recorded on LPC's books was known by all the offerees from the
beginning ...
In the present context, the determinative question appears to be,
how much reliance would the offerees probably have placed upon
the particular missing information, had it been discoverable and
disclosed to them, in deciding whether to invest? In this case, defen-
dants have shown that such reliance would probably have been
minimal. Thus the offerees' lack of access to the particular kind of
information which registration would have disclosed in this case is
not per se fatal to the defendants' claim of exemption but is only
one of the many attendant circumstances which must be assessed
in applying the Ralston Purina test.86
We might contrast the foregoing somewhat relaxed view of the
Massachusetts court with that of the Fifth Circuit in Woolf concern-
ing the same type of omissions.
It does not appear that S.D. Cohn & Co.'s 7- per cent commis-
sion was disclosed until the delivery of the debenture agreement for
signature, and our examination of the record does not reveal when,
if ever, the additional 10% interest in the debentures was disclosed




* . . [i]t is reasonably clear that they did not receive financial
statements or other information bearing on the prior performance
of the predecessor corporation as they would have had the deben-
tures been registered."
From this, the Woolf court drew the conclusion that
[i]t follows that they [plaintiff] must show that the omissions or
misrepresentations of information that make the § 4(2) exemption
unavailable to the defendants, in their cumulative effect, were such
that a reasonable investor, had the information registration would
have afforded been available, might have considered them impor-
tant in the making of his investment decision. They need not show
that they themselves would have relied on the information the defen-
dants failed to disclose. Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah
v. United States, 1972, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d
741.11
We certainly must agree with the Woolf court in its application
of Affiliated Ute Citizens though we may disagree with it on the
mechanical application of the need to disclose all of the information
required by Schedule A as opposed to the more flexible standards of
the Livens court.8 9
H. Andrews: Control Persons as Underwriters in Private Offerings
Probably the most unusual of the recent cases is Andrews v.
Blue9" decided by the United States Court of Appeals in the Tenth
Circuit in November of 1973. Plaintiff owned a twenty percent bene-
ficial interest in the outstanding shares of a real estate corporation,
Cherry Creek, which were registered in the name of the defendants,
who were the beneficial and registered owners of the balance of the
shares. Defendants caused Cherry Creek to merge with Medic-
Shield, a public corporation, and plaintiff received shares of the
merged corporation in satisfaction of his twenty percent beneficial
" 515 F.2d at 613-14.
u Id. at 614.
81 Although the Livens court concentrates on "reliance" of plaintiff (see text accompany-
ing note 86), it appears certain that the crucial question is the materiality of the undisclosed
information to the offerees. In this case, the missing information related to accounts payable;
all other information appears to have been available. Even if under Affiliated Ute Citizens,
plaintiffs need not show that they would have "relied" on the undisclosed information, surely
they must show that it was material. Affiliated Ute Citizens blends the distinction between
reliance and material into semantic stew.
" 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973).
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interest. Since plaintiff was not a registered owner of Cherry Creek
shares, he did not receive a merger proxy or any other information
concerning the transaction. The defendants, both before and after,
refused to furnish him with requested information pertaining to the
transaction, refused his request for registered shares, and in fact,
delivered him restricted shares.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages based in part upon the
contention that the issuance of the shares of the merged corporation
to him was not exempt under the provisions of § 4(2). Aside from the
plaintiff, only the two defendants appear to have been the recipients
of the shares in this transaction. They, as the registered owners of all
of the shares of Cherry Creek, had received both adequate informa-
tion and were sophisticated investors. It was further conceded that the
plaintiff's interest in the transaction was unknown to Medic-Shield.
The trial court ruled (and the circuit court affirmed the ruling) that
the plaintiff was not a knowledgeable investor and he did not have
access to the available information because of the failure of the defen-
dants to furnish him with requested information. The court also had
no trouble finding that the defendants were liable as statutory under-
writers under § 2(11) of the Act.
Consider the transaction from the standpoint of the issuer,
Medic-Shield, who was not a party to the litigation. It was in the
position of losing a private offering exemption where it had dealt with
two sophisticated investors who had access to adequate information,
because these investors concealed the fact that twenty percent of their
interest was held beneficially for a third party to whom they had
refused to furnish information.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS FROM PRACTICING ATTORNEYS
Two committees of the sections of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association have issued position
papers considering different aspects of the applicable criteria for the
private placement exemption under § 4(2) outside of the rule. The
Committee on Developments and Business Financing dealt with the
§ 4(2) exemption as it relates to private placements of long-term debt
securities with institutions. The Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities focused on private placements of equity securities of a type
typically sold to individuals and often involving a high degree of risk.
The editor's note that introduces both of the papers states that while
they do not represent the official views of the American Bar Associa-
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tion, because of the expertise of the drafters they are entitled to "be
given authoritative weight."'"
A. Private Offerings of Debt Securities
The Position Paper of the Committee on Developments and
Business Financing, Section Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, which for convenience we will designate as the Debt Position
Paper, 2 emphasized that despite all the attention that has been given
to the subject of private placements, the focus jhas been on private
placement of equity, and private placement of debt has not been a
problem. Thus the Debt Position Paper states:
[t]he institutional private placement of debt securities has been a
major method of corporate financing for more than forty years.
Since the Commission does not appear to have given public notice,
by release or other action, of any case of unwarranted reliance on
the section 4(2) exemption in connection with such private place-
ments, it should be reasonably safe to assume that there have been
no significant abuses in this important area of corporate financ-
ing.9
After a review of the history of debt financing, the Debt Position
Paper comes to the conclusion that the guides drawn from experience
in cases relating to equity financing are not applicable and the Debt
Position paper suggests a view of its own. Among the most important
guides is that each of the offerees should be a corporation, trust, fund
or other organization that qualifies as an institutional investor; that
is, an investor that regularly acquires debt securities for investment.
Such an institutional investor, it is concluded, is able to fend for itself
within the meaning of Ralston Purina. Ancillary to this requirement
is that there should be some limit upon the number of offerees and a
record should be made of each. With regard to the manner of offer-
ing, the guides suggest that the offering should either be sold by direct
negotiations between the issuer and the offeree or through an agent
of the issuer, such as an investment banker.
Another guide provides that "[t]he issuer should furnish or make
available to each institutional offeree sufficient information concern-
ing the issuer and the securities being offered to enable each offeree
" 31 Bus. LAW. 483 (1975).
92 Institutional Private Placements Under the Section 4(2) Exemption of The Securities
Act of 1933. 31 Bus. LAW. 515 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Debt Position Paper].
11 Id. at 541.
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to make an informed decision concerning the proposed investment."94
The important thing to note in connection with this guide is that
institutional offerees are presumed to have both the investment expe-
rience and the leverage or bargaining power to obtain the information
that they require. The guides note that institutional investors ordinar-
ily acquire securities for investment and not with the view to, or for
sale in connection with, any distribution of securities. Perhaps the
most substantial difference between the Debt Position Paper and
general views toward equity private placements is the rejection of the
concept of legends on the securities, stop transfer instructions, and
nonresale agreements. Many institutional investors have substantial
difficulties with the concept of legends and stop transfer instructions
and will not accept securities that have them. Of course, institutional
investors ordinarily do not resell, thus eliminating the need for re-
strictive legends when dealing with such investors. This certainly is
one of the relevant differences between private placements of debt
and equity securities, and in fact, representatives of institutional
investors were critical of the provisions for legends in the rule.
Finally, the guides provide that the purchase and sale of the
securities must be pursuant to an agreement that contains appropri-
ate representations by the parties thereto and provisions for opinions
of special counsel to the institutional investors to the effect that it is
not necessary to register the securities under the Act or to qualify an
indenture in respect of the securities under the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939."5
The Debt Position Paper notes the extensive volume of private
placements of debt securities.
In 1973 and 1974, private placements of debt securities aggregated
approximately $7.87 billion and $6.17 billion, respectively. This fig-
ure aggregated approximately $39.62 billion for the period from
1956 through 1964 and approximately $66.74 billion for the period
from 1965 through 1974. Thus, private placements of debt securities
for these two periods totaled approximately $106.36 billion. 6
It expresses the belief "that it would be highly unfortunate for issuers
and for the financial community in general if any developments
should occur that would impair the present effective use of institu-
tional private placements of debt securities. 9 7 Obviously, this
" Id. at 538.
15 U.S.C. § 77 aaa (1970).




expression refers to the fear of the growing trend toward exclusivity
of rule 146.98
B. Private Offerings of Equity Securities
In the position paper of the Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee (the Position Paper),9 four principal factors in a private
placement are identified:
(1) offeree qualifications,
(2) availability of information,
(3) manner of offering, and
(4) absence of redistribution.
In discussing offeree qualifications, it is noted that offerees may
be qualified to understand the risk, on the basis of their ability to
understand the risk-that is, sophistication; on their ability to assume
the risk-i.e. wealth; or on their relationship with the issuer or pro-
moter-that is, employment, family ties, friendships, or businsss rela-
tions. The Position Paper thus neatly ties together several varying
concepts that are generally expressed by the staff of the Commission
in no-action letters by the question, "Does the offeree need protection
that registration affords?"
The second factor considers the availability of information.
Under this heading, the Position Paper deals with the traditional
concepts of access through the relationship with the issuer or eco-
nomic bargaining power, in addition to the furnishing of information
contemplated under the rule. In one place the Position Paper notes
that it is probably adequate to give basic information concerning the
issuer's financial condition, results of operations, business, property
and management, and notes that it is doubtful whether all the forego-
ing categories of information are required in every case. 100 We must
contrast this position with that of the courts in the Woolf, Universal
Major Industries, Haber and Parvin cases,"' which seem to require
all of the Schedule A information.
Under manner of offering, the obvious consideration of avoiding
general advertising is noted and the number of offerees is de-
emphasized. The same unexceptional position is developed with re-
" See note 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
" Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485 (1975).
'" Id. at 535-36, citing Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass.
1974).
"I See text accompanying notes 61, 77, 80 and 81.
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spect to the absence of redistribution. However, the point is made
that mechanical aids, such as legends, investment letters, and stop
transfer orders, though useful, should not be considered as indispen-
sable.
One of the most interesting ideas in the Position Paper is its
reflections upon the question of burden of proof. Many cases involv-
ing private placements have been decided on the basis that the burden
of proof is on the defendant to prove the availability of an exemption
from registration requirements of § 5 of the Act and the defendant
had failed to meet its burden of proof. The author previously criti-
cized this approach.102 The Position Paper carries that analysis far-
ther by noting that all sales of securities, regardless of the manner of
offering, are subject to registration if the jurisdictional means set
forth in the Act are used, including all stock traded on national stock
exchanges. It notes that the exemptions are nothing but a drafting
technique to separate sales requiring registration from those that do
not. The position developed is that once the defendant has shown that
the offering was conducted generally in the proper manner and that
the plaintiff himself was a proper purchaser, the burden of going
forward shifts to the plaintiff to show some defect in the transaction.
The only reported case that lends support to this position is Grenader
v. Spitz,0 a case which involves the § 3(a)(1 1) exemption. The court
noted that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of sales to nonresidents
of New York, and that while the burden of proof on the exemption
issue is on the defendants, plaintiffs cannot rebut the defendants'
prima facie case with mere allegations. Defendants do not appear to
have offered any evidence other than affidavits of certain persons that
the plaintiffs claimed were nonresidents. In these affidavits, such
persons claimed to have been residents.
0
,o Schwartz, supra note 2, at 747 n.36. The essence of the criticism is the manner in which
the decision on burden of proof was made, especially the apparent reliance on the case of
Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907). That case involved
the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 that required an automatic coupling device on all railroad
cars, with certain exceptions. Plaintiff's decedent was killed while trying to couple a steam
shovel to a train which did not have the device. On appeal, defendant railroad argued that
plaintiff had not proved that the steam shovel was not the kind of car exempted from the
statute. Justice Holmes ruled that the burden was on the defendant to show that the cars were
exempt from the statute. Plaintiff's decedent was clearly among one of the classes of persons
whom the statute was designed to protect. It is less clear that this is true of the plaintiffs in
several of the cases noted herein, such as Haber, supra note 78. Nor is the Act as straightfor-
ward as the Safety Appliance Act of 1893 either in content or drafting technique.




Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in a recent speech stated "[i]f we can make it cheaper,
particularly for small businesses and developing companies, to raise
capital, those companies may not have the same tendency to be
squeezed out of the capital market in the months and years ahead."' °4
From our prior examination of rule 146 and the review of recent
litigation, it is evident that neither the Commission nor the courts
have come to grip with this problem of venture capital formation.
One avenue of hope is presented by the proposed Federal
Securities Code being drafted under the guidance of Louis Loss as
the reporter. Section 227 provides a simpler scheme for what is de-
fined as a limited offering."05 Another possibility may be found in the
exemptive powers of the Commission under § 3 (b) of the Act.'0 ' We
have previously outlined a plan for the full use of the Commission's
exemptive powers for a limited offering.' 7 Some discussion is heard
"I N.Y. Law Journal, December 15, 1975.
10 (1) A "limited offering" is one in which the following conditions are satis-
fied: (A) the initial buyers of the securities are institutional investors or not more
than thirty-five other persons or both; (B) resales of any of the securities to persons
other than institutional investors within three years after the last sale to any of the
initial buyers other than institutional investors do not result in more than thirty-five
owners of those securities (apart from any institutional investors and persons who
become owners otherwise than by purchase) at any one time, unless the resales are
pursuant to an offering statement, a distribution statement, or an exemption; and
(C) the original offeror and all sellers in such resales complay with any rules adopted
under paragraph (4).
(4) The Commission may require by rule (A) that the seller, as well as any reseller
within the one-year or three-year period (as the case may be) specified in paragraph
(I) and (2), obtain an appropriate written undertaking from his buyer in an offering
that purports to be a limited offering. (B) that a security that is the subject of a
limited offering contain an appropriate restriction on transferability, and (C) that
any transfer agent be given an appropriate stop-transfer notice, in each case designed
to avoid a distribution that would violate section 501(a) or 509(b).
Federal Securities Code, § 227(b); Reports Revision of Text of Tenative Drafts Nos. 1-3,
October 1, 1974, The American Law Institute.
' The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and
subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of
securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the
enforcement of this title with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public
interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved
or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be
exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is
offered to the public exceeds $500,000
1-1 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1970).
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about increasing the amount of the exemption under § 3(b) from
$500,000 to $1,000,000. °S This is entirely appropriate in light of
today's inflationary economy. With the attention of the Chairman of
the Commission focused upon these problems, there may be hope
that changes will come.
"I Schwartz, supra note 2, at 777, 779.
